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Austerity reforms have, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, been the norm for the 
Spanish fiscal policy. At the same time, the Spanish political system has experienced 
instability due to the disruption of new political forces. Literature has studied in multiple 
occasions the political costs of fiscal policy without reaching a general consensus. In the 
same line, this thesis suggests that austerity, by weakening the social protection programs, 
have been a relevant factor behind the political instability increase. This hypothesis is 
tested using a panel dataset from 1996 to 2015 for the different Spanish regions. The 
estimates for the proposed models suggest a positive and significant relation between 
social benefits changes and political instability. However, the relation is not established 
with in-kind transfers. These results can be consistent with the idea that cuts on more 
critical public expenditure, as the case of social benefits which usually reach low-income 
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In the aftermath of the 2008 Economic Crisis, instability has established in the Spanish 
political scenario as the new norm. The unprecedented electoral repetitions in 2016 and 
2019, the long periods with an acting government or the fact that only one administration 
has finished its term in office since 2008, well prove that. The reason for such a change 
could be blamed on the appearance of new political actors in the traditionally bipartisan 
Spanish politics. The fragmentation of the political scope in conjunction with the lack of 
a pact culture in the Spanish institutions, lead to a situation of political inoperability which 
built the climate for political unrest. Still, it is relevant to note that parties similar to the 
ones that broke the bipartisan paradigm, already existed previous to 2014 but without the 
success of the latter. And, in fact, many of those already existing parties ended up 
dissolving into the new and more successful ones. The question that this paper will try to 
answer is to which extend can the implementation of austerity and fiscal consolidation 
measures after 2010 explain the instable political situation that Spain is immersed in. 
The literature analysing voter behaviour is now in upswing, motivated by the recent 
upraise of populist and non-mainstream political ideas. Scholars have analysed many 
relations between recent electoral results and other variables as unemployment (Algan, 
Guriev, Papaioannou and Passari, 2017), inequality (Alesina and Perotti, 1996), 
globalisation (Rodrik, 2018) and fiscal consolidations (Alesina, Carloni and Lecce, 2011; 
Alesina, Perotti and Tavares, 1998; Arias and Stasavage, 2016; Fetzer, 2019; Ponticelli 
and Voth, 2017). However, although analysing the same subject from different 
perspectives, a general consensus exists on the idea of individuals seeking external 
accountability when they are worse off. Given this retrospective voting dynamics, it is 
not insensible to relate a major economic shock as the 2009 Financial Crisis, which 
severely disrupted household’s economies, to be a relevant and significant event changing 
the established political paradigm. Nonetheless, this is not a change which has happened 
overnight. Many scholars, like Dani Rodrik, agree on the view that this political change, 
and the recent populist rise, comes from farther away and as a response to hyper-
globalisation. From whose distributional effects losers and winners have been derived. In 
front of such situation, the welfare state becomes an agent of stabilisation, which could - 
if well implemented (Antràs, de Gortari and Itskhoki, 2016) - lessen the negative effects 
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of shocks by establishing redistributive systems that compensate losers while not 
imposing a dead-weight to the economy. However, with the financial crisis, many 
European states – more prominently in the South - have seen their welfare state severely 
hit by austerity measures imposed on behalf of economic sustainability. This drives the 
logic to think that, by implementing austerity and lowering the safety net that welfare 
system represents, those more affected by negative economic shocks will seek for new 
non-mainstream political ideas, as traditional parties will have proven to be unable to 
work for their situation. It is here, where populist parties emerge as platforms that 
encapsulates these feelings against the traditional politics way of doing. Populist 
ideologies have historically proven to be a threat for the stability and the 
institutionalisation of any political system. For that reason, it one might think that by the 
implementation of austerity measures, the political stability of a system will be harmed. 
However, this logic does not so clearly translate into data, where mixing results have been 
found regarding the relation between austerity and political instability. Alberto Alesina, 
probably the most prolific scholar in this issue, has empirically studied the relation with 
results opposing the above established logic. In Alesina et al. (1998) it was explored how 
leader turnover and political support varied due to fiscal consolidation measures. The 
results pointed at voters not punishing governments carrying deficit cuts. Similar 
investigation was also done in Alesina et al. (2011), using more recent data.  In both 
papers it is suggested that the findings could be the result of reverse causality and 
selection problems where only strong governments, being aware of their position, 
implement reforms. Arias and Stasavage (2019), reviewed the same question with a 
similar strategy, but controlling for the selection problems identified by Alesina et al. 
(2011). They implemented an instrumental variable estimation (IV) approach to solve 
reverse causality problems. Their conclusion pointed in the same direction as Alesina et 
al. (1998) and Alesina et al. (2011). They conclude opening three possibilities which 
could explain the counter-logical findings: either the voter does not notice austerity, not 
mind, or is too anchored in political allegiances (Arias and Stasavage, 2019).   
Contrarily, there are studies like Voth and Ponticelli (2017), which identified a strong 
correlation between budget-cuts and political unrest episodes, after empirically testing 
the correlation in a panel of 25 European countries in the period 1919-2008. Also 
interesting are the results from Fetzer (2019), who by using both, regional macrodata and 
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microdata from personal surveys, analyses the raise of UKIP and the vote for Leave in 
the Brexit referendum given the effect of the main austerity reforms implemented by the 
government. In these latter studies, the logic established previously linking austerity and 
political unrest would find empirical support.  
Motivation for understanding the reasons that drive political unrest emerge from the 
recognition of the link between political stability and economic development (Barro, 
1991; Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel, 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1996).  Knowing 
the reasons and the consequences that austerity can have in society and their relationship 
with the institutions, is relevant when making decisions about debt and public 
expenditure. In Alesina and Drazen (1989) are studied the reasons why policy makers 
postpone necessary reforms and the drawbacks of doing so. In it, the electoral schedule 
and turnover fear for incumbents, reveal as important factors in the decision to whether 
undertake important policies. As a policy maker, making decisions driven by potential 
electoral outcome more than by what is best for society represents a failure of the system. 
This is further exacerbated with the rise of economic populism, when the victory of easy 
and short-termed protection policies comes at the cost of long-term stability and 
development. One might consider instability as a necessary engine for change which 
allows society to progress. Thus, a certain degree of instability in society might be even 
desirable. Still, as a society, we should bear in mind the costs that periods of great political 
instability have had in the past. 
 
This paper aims to empirically prove the effects of austerity on political instability in the 
case study of Spain in the post-crisis period and it is structured as follows. Section 2 
explores what theory says about the dynamics in the supply and demand side of the 
political system and builds the theoretical framework under which this thesis is found. 
On Section 3 it is examined empirical results in previous article which explored similar 
questions as this thesis does. Section 4 discusses strategies used in literature to define the 
concepts of political instability and austerity and set the strategy followed in this thesis 
presenting the data to be used. In section 5 different models are proposed and results are 
analysed in confrontation to the proposed hypothesis. Finally, Section 6 concludes and 




2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
When approaching the concept of political system, it is not unusual to see economists 
interpreting it similarly to a market system1. There is a supply side for political ideas 
represented by political parties, and a demand side for such ideas represented by voters. 
Any researcher would recognize the trade-off between simplification and depth, 
acknowledging its limitations and understanding that there is much more happening 
behind. But, for the sake of simplicity, and because of the economic perspective of this 
paper, the interpretation of the political system as a market for political ideas is going to 
be used, acknowledging in advance the limitations that taking this interpretation have.  
2.1 Political system: the supply side 
In understanding the supply side of the political system, it is specially enlightening the 
cleavage theory developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who identify political parties as 
“agents of conflict and instruments of integration" (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967:3) . In few 
words, political parties are understood to be agents of conflict because they compete 
against each other in the system and they collide. While at the same time, and as a result 
of conflict, people with similar political ideas cluster in their opposition against the other 
groups. So, parties could be understood as creating an ‘us against them’ in society. The 
relevant thing is then to understand what differentiates people in us and people in them. 
In this direction Lipset and Rokkan theory states that societies are faced with major events 
in history that break society in groups and originate cleavage, which create long lasting 
divisions in society. These cleavages will, depending on the political system structure and 
design, translate in the appearance of new political parties or, in the acquisition by already 
existing parties of the cleavage rhetoric.  In the original work by Lipset and Rokkan, two 
revolutions are identified to be the base for major cleavages in society: the industrial 
revolution, creating the cleavage between capital and labour; and the nation-state 
revolution, creating territorial cleavages.  
 
 
1 This approach can be seen in many political economist papers but remarkable for their relevance with this 
thesis topic are: “Populism and the economics of globalization” by Rodrik, “Populism: Supply and 
Demand” by Guiso et. Al. and “Economic Losers and Political Winners: Sweden’s Radical Right” by Dal 
Bó et al. among many other. 
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Since the release of the article in 1967, societies have evolved and nowadays, the second 
part of the political party definition by Lipset and Rokkan -the one claiming political 
parties as agents of integration- feels less appropriate given the decline of organizations 
which used to tie voters with parties. However, big part of their theory is still relevant on 
explaining the supply side of the political system. Hooghe and Marks (2018), re-visit in 
their article the theories by Lipset and Rokkan in the current European post-crisis context, 
identifying the appearance of new cleavages due not only to the financial crisis, but also 
a transnationalism cleavage as a result of the European integration in the last two decades. 
Additionally, one remarkable conclusion from the article is the study of the new parties’ 
appearance, which they attribute to the inflexibility of existing parties and their lack of 
re-alignment capacity. These findings are empirically tested making use of the Chapel-
Hill Expert Survey (CHES Data), which displays a clear image of traditional parties 
sticking to a certain position. Even more interestingly, traditional parties - which diverge 
in several topics among them - appear usually aligned in the response to new appearing 
cleavages as it is the European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). The inflexibility 
of traditional parties in conjunction with the usually low barriers of entry of the European 
political systems, have paved the way to new challenger parties occupying the empty 
spaces that traditional parties left 2. It is in these spaces - away from traditional parties - 
where populist movements can proliferate. This introduces the concept of populism, 
present in many political circles across Europe, but still a vague concept not well defined. 
To some degree, there is a consensus among the literature on the main features that 
describe populist ideologies. As Guiso, Herrera, Morelli and Sonno (2018) argue when 
defining populism, the concept will always be subject to a certain degree of subjectivity.  
2.2 Supply side: populism 
The main characteristic of populism generally accepted by the literature like in van Kessel 
(2015) or Rodrik (2017a) is that populist parties’ motto is the positioning against the 
establishment and the elites, which are said to be acting against the popular interest. This 
type of discourse, as Rodrik notes, does not fall specifically in one of the two sides of 
class ideology cleavage. Populism is not something unique of the right nor the left, but 
 
2 For instance, in Spain a party with 3% of vote in a given geographical section can have institutional 
representation. This represents lower barriers compared to a ‘winner takes it all’ system present in 
some Anglo-Saxon political systems.  
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rather both types of populism exist, and can even co-exist in the same political system. 
Rodrik explores the factors determining the development of populism to be more prone 
in one side than the other, relating populism with the way that globalisation shocks have 
been felt in society (Rodrik, 2017b). If globalisation shocks are more recognisable in the 
form of immigration and ethnic change, the nationalist discourse done by right populists 
will have more acceptance in society. While if the shocks take the form of supra-national 
financial institutions setting the rules of the game, the discourse blaming this elite 
supported by left populists will more likely soak through society. Translating these 
findings to the European scenario, Rodrik identifies a divergence between the populism 
surged after the Euro-crisis in countries in the South, where opposition to the Troika and 
the measures imposed by Brussels made left populism more prone, and Northern and 
Central Europe, where populism has been more right salient due to perceptible ethnic 
changes in society caused by immigration. We see how left populist parties emerged in 
Greece with Syriza, Spain with Podemos or Italy with Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S)3. 
While in Central and Northern Europe parties such Front National in France, FPO in 
Austria or Sweden Democrats - whose rise has been very well pictured in Dal Bó, Finan, 
Folke, Persson and Rickne (2019) -, have experience and upward trend on the polls.  This 
differences among European regions are also observed in Algan et al. (2017), where not 
only populist ideology is found to be heterogenous among European regions but also the 
pattern in which populism correlates to unemployment. 
 
In this literature, a big consensus exists to relate the recent emergence of populist ideas 
with the distributional effects of globalisation, from which a situation of winners and loser 
is derived. Maybe the most prolific in this field has been Dani Rodrik and his notion of 
the globalisation trilemma, which fits especially well in the European context4. The 
process of integrations into which European countries have dived for the last two decades, 
has been anchored on two of the vertices of the prism: hyper-globalisation, with the 
 
3 Movimento Cinque Stelle might not be explicitly characterised by a leftist discourse but do incorporate 
the rhetoric against the elites and supra-national institutions that characterised the populism emerged in 
Southern Europe in contrast to the nativist populism usually found in Northern Europe. 
4 The three vertices of the prism are said to be hyper-inflation, national sovereignty and mass politics, this 
last understood as the capacity of states to answer the needs of the population. Rodrik defends that only 
two vertices are simultaneously possible and that some tension will emanate from leaving the other apart. 
This tension is usually exploited by populist ideas.  
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creation of a single market, and national sovereignty, in a situation where states still kept 
a big share of its power. This equilibrium in the trilemma has been at the cost of losing 
responsiveness capacity on what Rodrik encapsulates as mass politics or democracy. By 
scaling the economy to a trans-national dimension while preserving power and action to 
the national level, the capacity of institutions to respond to a massive shock, as it has been 
the 2009 Financial Crisis, has been limited. This malfunctioning of the Union on its 
response to a major event, has opened a new cleavage in society hugely exploited by 
populist movements (UKIP, Cinque Stelle, FN…).  
 
Populist parties usually finely understand the limitations and tensions emerging from the 
globalisation trilemma, and go upfront rejecting the hyper-globalisation vertex, in favour 
of more national sovereignty and more capacity of the state to respond. This is seen in 
their discourse, but by overrepresenting losers of globalisation processes in their ranks 
(Dal Bo et al., 2019). This contrasts with traditional parties who, by acknowledging the 
benefits each of the three vertices have, try to do a dishonest balancing act when facing 
the trilemma. This difference with traditional parties, is perceived by Rodrik (2018) as 
one of the reasons behind the success of populism. However, just as populist are good at 
naming the problems, they do not do so well on solving them. Another key element in 
populist rhetoric is the “disregard for longer-term on the premise of short-term 
protection” (Guiso et al., 2018). This feature is especially significant when understanding 
the dynamics of its demand, but also depicts one of the main reasons for which the success 
of populism is undesirable. By concentrating in the short-term and easy policies, long-
term might be jeopardized, making sustainability to stay at risk. The best example of such 
behaviour is the protectionist fever by populist parties who, by taking the largely 
discredited mercantilist view, forget about the gains from trade. At this point, it is relevant 
to highlight the findings by Antràs, Gortari and Itskhoki (2016), who examine channels 
through which distributional effects induced by trading activity can be compensated.  In 
their article, they accept the flaws of the classical Kaldor-Hicks criterion, based on the 
unrealistic assumption of non-distortionary means of redistribution and develop a 
taxation model. This model is indeed distortionary. But under the view of inequality as 
an undesirable externality for society, its distortion is overcome by the gains from 
redistribution. These findings point at the existence of good policies to reduce the 
distributional consequences of globalisation, by compensating its losers, without rejecting 
globalisation itself.  
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2.3 Political system: the demand side 
If understanding the supply side is seems quite straight forward – there is a cleavage in 
society which translates in new parties arising or traditional ones incorporating it -, the 
demand side of the equation is much more complex. A very interesting approach, which 
again adapts economic theory into the political system, is the one identifying the situation 
as an agency problem in the situation (Wolfers, 2002). In such situation, voters are the 
principals, with incomplete information observing the performance of the agent – the 
political incumbent –, and they have to make decisions on whether the incumbent is valid 
or not. This decision is not just subject to the capacity of the politician but also on how 
information is disentangled and how the principal is able to distinguish the incumbent’s 
responsibility on the observed results. When facing the topic of voter’s behaviour, the 
literature has raised two main issues of examination: how informed voters are and how 
well information is used.  
 
When judging the capacity of officeholders, individuals cannot have precise and complete 
information. Rather, they only know their own situation and perceive the one of people 
in their surroundings, evaluating well-being as outcome of government policies. It is easy 
to see how economic information will definitely be taken into account on the ballots. 
However, the debate among scholars is on the direction that the evaluation takes, on 
which indicators do influence voters the most and, accordingly on which indicators will 
better explain voter’s behaviour. There are two directions in which voters can base their 
decisions: they can look backwards using information from the past retrospective voting 
or, they can base their decisions on what they expect to be happening in the future 
prospective voting. We find empirical research defending each of these two positions. 
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001), investigate the effect of both retrospective and 
prospective voting in the US National Elections, finding that it is not one or the other but 
rather both have a significant effect on the polls. The effect of retrospective voting 
becomes more relevant when incumbent opts to re-election, while the opposed – and with 
similar figures - holds when incumbent does not present candidacy. These results seem 
to follow the logic of voters judging incumbent on past economic matters, but conceding 




Again, Lipset (1959) becomes a reference to understand the sociological dynamics behind 
the above defined logic. Lipset defines and explores the concepts of efficiency, 
effectiveness and legitimacy, as necessary characteristics for the stability of a system.  The 
efficiency of a system refers to well-functioning of it, whereas the effectiveness has to do 
with the capacity of the system to reach all strata and the ability to fulfil expectations. 
The legitimacy has to do with the capacity of the system to maintain the idea that it is the 
most proper for society. It is clear that a malfunctioning system or a system that does not 
fulfil expectations for a long enough period, will lack of legitimacy by society and this 
will translate into instability. Huntington (1968) identifies legitimacy as the primary 
problem for political power formation and that legitimate institutions – or level of 
institutionalisation as Huntington puts it- are necessary in order to avoid a state lagging 
its development on society’s evolution. For Huntington a system needs adaptability, to 
overcome changes and readapt over time; complexity, to have the ability of readapting; 
autonomy, as to be isolated from non-political shocks; and coherence. Dani Rodrik 
(2014), who in the same terms, explains the situation in advanced countries. He identifies 
governments losing legitimacy due to “its inability to deliver effective economic policies 
for growth and inclusion” (Rodrik, 2014). The source of such inability is, under Rodrik’s 
view, the asymmetric process of globalisation and power, and the fitting of nation-states 
in the new paradigm. The situation portrayed by Rodrik is the one of an effectiveness 
crisis, as the new paradigm does indeed entail efficiency, but fails when making this 
efficiency inclusive by redistributive mechanisms.  
 
With respect to the question on how voters use observed information, the literature has 
explored it under the concept of voter rationality. Usually two profiles of voters are 
identified: rational voters and naïve ones. What distinguishes a rational voter from a naïve 
one is its capacity to understand the observed information and rightly assign 
responsibilities. A good definition of this is found in Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997): 
“a naïve voter would punish an unlucky incumbent, whereas a rational voter would, at 
least in part, take bad luck into consideration”. Achen and Bartels (2006) does a very 
nice review on different historical events which fell far from the scope of officeholders - 
such shark attacks, droughts and flu - which had political backlash. More recent studies 
such Wolfers (2002), do identify similar pattern in modern times which would have to 
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question the rationality of voters5. However, it could also be the case where, in front of 
an exogenous shock, new information about the incumbent’s capacity is revealed. In such 
scenario, we would expect from a rational voter to take this new information into 
consideration (Ashworth, Bueno and Friedenberg, 2017). As one can see, the line between 
both types of voters is not so clear-cut defining rationality by the capacity of voters to 
distinguish endogenous from exogenous shocks. An exogenous shock by itself will not 
reveal new information about the incumbent, but its management, will definitely reveal 
new information. In conclusion, Wolfers (2002) does acknowledge the unfeasibility to 
expect a fully rational profile of voter. Still, he accepts that the rational profile is much 
more realistic than the naïve one, where voters can be easily fooled by expenditure booms 
on electoral period. For that reason, voters are assumed by Wolfers to behave in a quasi-
rational manner, in which systematic attribution of errors is done by voters.  
 
Given the theoretical framework it is expected that austerity measures will have a 
negative effect on the stability of the political system, as by imposing restrictions on 
state’s redistributive tools, their effect will be reduced, and the effectiveness of the system 
will resent. Also, austerity lowers the safety net that the welfare state represents for 
society and which is expected to be safeguarded by the political system. Economic 
conditions are also expected to play an important role on the stability of the system, as 
retrospective voting is predicted to be more significant than prospective voting.  
Following these hypotheses, the observed rise of populist parties would be the result of 
voters seeking for alternatives to traditional parties, or in other words, that the political 




5 Wolfers (2002) identifies how in US states where oil-production is an important industry, usually the 
electoral outcome at local level depends on the price of oil, which clearly is out of the local incumbent.   
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3 STATE OF EVIDENCE 
 
When translating the discussion about the political cost of austerity measures into 
empirical evidence, we find a mixture of results. In the literature, two waves have been 
seen explicitly investigating the relationship between these two variables. A first wave of 
articles appeared in the 90’s, motivated by the Maastricht-mandate. This first wave 
developed the already existing voter behaviour literature of the 80’s to focus on the effects 
of fiscal policy. More recently it has been overcome by a major second wave of research 
in the post-crisis years, when austerity measures have concentrated the attention of 
political economics.  
 
From the first wave of research, probably the most relevant is Alesina et al. (1998) 
analysis of the effects of fiscal adjustments, and, specifically, on establishing causality 
between fiscal consolidation and political costs.  They used a panel of 19 OECD 
countries, all of them culturally Western countries with the exception of Japan, in the 
period 1960-1995. On paper, they identify several means by which welfare cuts may 
entail a political cost for the incumbent. Welfare cuts are perceived to be more permanent 
and to be increasing post-tax inequality (Alesina et al. 1998: 212). They proceed by probit 
regressing ideological change and prime minister change after an election - capture both 
by dummy variables - against variables capturing deficit reductions. In order to avoid 
identified problems with the deficit variable, researches use three different variables 
accounting for it: deficit reduction as a percentage GDP, deficit reduction cyclically 
corrected and averaged deficit reduction in the overall term. None of these variable draw 
significant results affecting the probability of ideological neither prime minister change. 
In the model, they also include control variables as incumbent’s tenure, cabinet’s structure 
or economic indicators. The control variables for government structure show significance 
and present the expected signs. On economic indicators, the only significant is inflation 
while GDP evolution and unemployment show expected sign but no significance. Aware 
of the possibility of the lag between policy and elections disturbing the results, researchers 
use similar strategy but using incumbent’s popularity estimates as dependant variable. 
This variable is a quicker, but less official, source for testing the waters of political costs.  
Still by changing the dependant variable, none of the deficit reduction variables reveal to 
have a significant effect. The article concludes with two possible explanations for the 
result: either the average voter is fiscally responsible and understands fiscal consolidation 
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as a need for sustainability of the system, or there exists a selection problem where only 
strong governments, aware of the political cost of austerity, implement needed fiscal 
consolidations. 
 
On the second wave of literature, Alesina retakes the analysis of fiscal adjustments 
concentrating this time on political consequences. In Alesina, Carloni and Lecce (2011) 
the relation between deficit adjustments and ideological turnover is analysed using a panel 
with the same 19 OCDE countries as in Alesina et al. (1998). The time series spans for 
33 years (1975-2008), which still excludes data from the post-crisis period. They used the 
same variables as in the preceding article and added a dummy allowing to differentiate 
big fiscal adjustment – those exceeding 1.5% GDP deficit changes – in order to 
distinguish conscious fiscal policy from cyclical disturbance. They also incorporated two 
variables accounting for the structure of the policy, distinguishing tax-based and 
expenditure-based policies. The results are similar to those previously found in Alesina, 
et al. (1998) with deficit changes being insignificant irrespective of the variable used. In 
the Alesina et al. (2011) the hypothesis of reverse causality taking place is further 
analysed. Finding coalition governments being slightly less propense to implement fiscal 
adjustments than governments with majority, which are assumed to be stronger 
governments. This would indicate at the strength of the government not greatly affecting 
the decision to whether implement or not tight fiscal policy. Yet, researchers appoint that 
these findings must be cautiously taken because of the measure not being capturing what 
a strong government is. This paper also reviews specific historical case studies of 
expenditure-based deficit adjustment in order to test found empirical results in reality.  
Cases as Finland 1993-1998, where government lost support after implementing fiscal 
consolidation but still got re-elected; Canada 1993-1997, where voters seem to 
acknowledge fiscal consolidation as time goes by; and UK 1994-1999, where incumbent 
was not re-elected after thigh fiscal policy (Alesina et al. 2011: 11).   
 
More recently Arias and Stasavage (2019) revisit the relation between political turnover 
and fiscal adjustments using a panel with a much broader time series (1870-2011) and 
also a broader sample with 32 middle- and high-income countries from Europe and 
America.  Unlike Alesina et al. (1998) and Alesina et al. (2011), Arias and Stasavage 
focus on government expenditure growth rather than on deficit adjustments. Also, as the 
sample is bigger, they can distinguish political turnover between regular turnover, caused 
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by democratic means, and irregular turnover, due to coups d’état. They regress separately 
regular and irregular political turnover depending on expenditure growth, measured by 
either real expenditure growth or expenditure as a percentage of GDP. First, the 
regression is done using simple OLS with time and country fixed effects. The results fail 
to be significant even when controlling for other economic indicators, no matter which 
expenditure growth variable is used. Being aware of potential reverse causality problem 
where only strong governments, more confident of re-election, implementing expenditure 
cuts, Arias and Stasavage consider decide also to implement IV estimation and 2SLS 
regression. They use trading partners economic situation and international cost of capital 
as instruments for changes in public expenditure. These are exogenous variables which 
prove to be strong instruments, which allow to discard reverse causality when used, as 
they exceed incumbent’s influence. By using this strategy, voter, - or at least the sufficient 
fraction of voters needed for turnover - is assumed to be naïve in case of significance, as 
they would be punishing incumbent for reasons that exceeds her or his capacity. Still by 
using IV estimation, the results in Arias and Stasavage (2019) keep drawing no significant 
relation between public expenditure changes and either regular or irregular political 
turnover.  
 
Given these results, the logic of fiscal contraction being punished at the pools, loses some 
ground. It was Alesina who, in a debate after a lecture related to his 2011 article6, admitted 
having tortured the data as much as he could in order to proof logic right, but that no 
correlation was found. However, there are multiple cases in literature where the relation 
has been proven significant. It is true that dependent variables used in this literature to 
account for political instability, differ from the one used by the prior. This difference in 
measuring political instability could be explaining the disparity in the results. This is 
further discussed in Section 4, where a review on the variables used in literature is done 
analysing the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy.  
 
Remarkable in the group of articles which find relation between fiscal policy and political 
outcome, is Fetzer (2019). The article analyses not government turnover, but the rise of 
 
6 “Fiscal policy after the Great Recession” Barcelona GSE XXI Lecture presented by Prof. Alberto 




populist ideas in the British political system, captured by the rise of Leave support in the 
Brexit referendum and the rise of UKIP party in the different elections. Fetzer uses two 
different approaches to the issue with two different sets of data. The first set involves 
aggregate data for 570 harmonized constituencies in the UK in the period 2000-2016. The 
panel is balanced and involves two main variables. The first is the vote share for UKIP 
party in the different elections which have taken place in the period. This variable is used 
as a way of measuring the support for Leave and also is a measure of how populism grow. 
The other main set of variables captures the different austerity reforms implemented. This 
data is taken from Beatty and Fothergill (2013), where the effect of the main fiscal 
reforms that British government undertook are quantified on a regional base. The 
estimation by Beatty and Fothergill (2013) involves dividing budget cut by the 
government that each reform produced. This total amount is divided by the total number 
of claimers or affected individuals, and then reallocated regionally by depending on the 
number of claimers that each region concentrates. With this data, Fetzer (2019) does a 
difference-in-difference regression, whose results establish a significant relation between 
all austerity reforms and the growth of political support for UKIP. The different reforms 
are analysed separately, finding reforms as child benefit less relevant than others such tax 
credit. This is justified by Fetzer on the ground of child-benefit affecting relatively well-
off households, while tax credit reforms affected almost exclusively low-income ones 
(Fetzer, 2019: 18). The second set of date involves microdata collected by surveys 
undertaken since 2009 by the Understanding Society study. The approach with this data 
is similar to the aggregate one but allows for greater monitorization of individuals and 
data.  The results of the difference-in-differences regression still display significant effect 
of the different austerity reforms on the probability of voting for UKIP. These results are 
robust after using different controls variables for time, region and survey wave fixed 
effects.  
 
Another paper finding a significant relation between budget cuts and instability is 
Ponticelli and Voth (2018). This paper includes a broad panel dataset ranging from 1919 
to 2008 and 25 European countries. This broad series allow to observe diverse episode of 
social unrest manifested with riots and demonstrations. These are not recurrent event but 
rather, periods with social instability, eventually occur. For that reason, considering a 
dataset which takes into account wide time series is an important asset for the study in 
order to observe diversity. Ponticelli and Voth, take a different interpretation from what 
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political instability is meant. All the previously mentioned articles were understanding 
political instability from an executive view, where instability is understood as not 
observing major disruptions in the functioning of the institutions. Ponticelli and Voth 
study is rather capturing social unrest perspective, where instability is understood to 
occur when there is social mobilization to protest against incumbent’s policies. With that 
purpose, they create the CHAOS index to measure degree of social unrest, capturing 
information regarding general strikes, massive demonstrations and political 
assassinations, among other variables, taking place. This is regressed on the evolution of 
primary public expenditures as a percentage of GDP and including control variables for 
different subsets of data, in order to discard economic downturn noise.  Relevant findings 
are that while expenditure cuts have a major impact on fuelling protest, tax increases do 
not seem to do so. These results could add a new dimension to Alesina and Ardagna 
(2009), where expenditure cuts are found to be more efficient and less economically 
disturbing and, consequently, more desirable when aiming fiscal consolidation.  
 
Finally, for the purpose of this thesis Algan et al. (2017) deserves special mention. 
Although the study does not share the objective of study with this thesis – in the case of 
Algan et al. (2017) it was the raise of non-mainstream ideologies support explained by 
economic effects of recession mainly in the form of unemployment-, it shares context 
with this thesis and the intention of detangling the reasons for populist and instability rise. 
In their research, a structural change in the vote for populist parties between the period 
pre and post-crisis is detected. The study finds a relation between the unemployment and 
non-mainstream voting which significantly holds at a regional disaggregation at NUTS2 
and NUTS3 level. However, this relation establishes differently depending on the 
European region. In the South it is seen how higher unemployment share correlates with 
more extreme left voting -Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece - while in 
transitioning countries - like the cases of Hungary or Poland -, and Central-Northern 
Europe, it is far-right parties which succeed. They establish an interconnection between 
economic discontent, trust in institutions and populist voting, which suggests that 
accountability voting has existed in the period. Furthermore, the losers from 
unemployment could be also the losers from austerity, it can be expected to see similar 




4 DATA  
 
It is the aim of this thesis to analyse if austerity reforms implemented in Spain have had 
an effect on political stability. A major challenge is faced when putting these two concepts 
– political instability and austerity – into quantifiable variables.  Also, as it has been 
identified in the previous section, the selection of variables could be the reason behind 
the disparity of empirical results in literature.  With that in mind, this section is devoted 
to deeper analyse the different strategies followed in literature when defining and 
quantifying the concepts, and to develop the strategy which is going to be followed in this 
thesis when quantifying both concepts: political instability and austerity.  
4.1 Measuring political instability 
Political instability is a highly abstract concept which is difficult to quantify and measure. 
Finding a variable that measures it properly, is complex and the approach will highly 
depend on the objectives set by the study. When speaking about political instability, 
literature usually refers to either executive instability or social unrest. The latter is, as 
seen in Section 3, the approach of Ponticelli and Voth (2017). But under the assumption 
that democracy is finely established, one might expect social unrest always translating 
into the polls. For this reason, and although it is true that relevant social unrest events 
have happened on the analysed period, this thesis will base the view of political instability 
understanding it as executive instability. As it is assumed that by using this approach, 
rather than using social unrest, the study will be indirectly capturing the changes on both 
dimensions.  
 
When approaching the concept from the perspective of executive instability, scholars 
have mainly used two different strategies: use leader turnover - as in Arias and Stasavage 
(2016) and Alesina et al. (2011) –, or the use voting results and derivates from it - as in 
Fetzer (2019), Algan et al. (2017) or Chiaramonte and Emmanuele (2017). Although both 
strategies take information from the same event – elections – they capture it differently. 
The former only take information about incumbent while the latter takes a broader picture, 
which could relate not that much with the stability of the incumbent but the stability of 
the political system.  
 
The use of leader turnover as an indicator of political instability, is justified under the 
assumption that when there is a high rate of leader turnover there is, for sure, political 
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instability. However, this variable might be too limited when small series are used in a 
framework where democracy is established, as there might exist rigidities in the system 
that allow for instability not well translating into turnover. Having high turnover rate can 
indicate political instability, but not having high turnover rate is inconclusive.  Arias and 
Stasavage (2019) acknowledge this flaw of using political turnover to measure instability, 
pointing that it could be the case in which voters opt for non-mainstream minor parties, 
but without the sufficient strength to displace the government. These events, if happening, 
would not be recorded by the measure of leader turnover while they could be very relevant 
in terms of stability of the political system.  A clear example of asymmetry between the 
measure and wat it is trying to capture is seen in the period 2011-2019. In this period, for 
example, leader turnover in Spain is equal to zero as Mariano Rajoy was in office for the 
full period. However, in this same period the governing party went from controlling 52% 
of the seats in parliament and governing in absolute majority into controlling just 40% of 
the seats and needing from third parties support. Also, in this period, an electoral 
repetition happened for the first time in Spanish democracy and there were 316 days with 
an acting government. This asymmetry, between the measure and actual political 
instability, suggest that political turnover could be a misguided strategy to follow if one 
is trying to see structural changes of the system. 
 
On the other hand, the usage of actual electoral results has as a benefit, that information 
captures a broader set of events happening in the political system, as it does not restrict 
to the specific and categorical event of political turnover. However, the big issue with 
electoral data is how to summarize all the information that it entails into a single measure 
which is manageable in a model. Literature usually focus on the evolution of specific 
agents in the political system as in Wolfers (2002), where the variable used is incumbent 
electoral share change, or in Algan et al. (2017), where the variable used is the electoral 
share of populist and non-mainstream parties. The former could seem similar to using 
political turnover, but it does supply the model with much more information regarding 
how incumbent has lost or earned support in the period. Using political turnover, this 
information is only captured when it takes extreme values. Also, by using voting share, 
the lost or earned support is quantified. The latter - putting the spotlight on other 
categories such populist ideology (Algan et al., 2017) or specific parties (Dal Bó et al., 
2019) voting share – allows to analyse the reasons behind the success or failure of the 
agent in question. These different approaches are useful when focusing the study on the 
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reasons for the success of a specific party or specific set of ideas. And although the rise 
of certain ideas such extremist -either left or right- or more importantly populist, have an 
impact on political instability, these measures are not seizing the full political system 
changes. 
 
Pedersen (1979) presented the electoral volatility index (TV), using electoral data. This 
index captures net electoral changes between elections of all agents in the political 
system. It is computed by adding all changes in parties electoral share in absolute values 
and then dividing by two to obtain an index that ranges from 0 to 1.  Expression (1) show 
the formula to compute TV, where s stands for electoral share of party i at election t and 
I is the set of parties participating on either election t or t-1.  
 





It is easy to see how a value of the index of 0 represents a fully static image where no 
electoral share changed for any of the parties in the system  ( 𝑠!,# −	𝑠!,#$% = 0		𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑖 ∈
𝐼 ), whereas a value 1 represents all incumbent parties in the system lost their votes in 
favour to parties outside of it. This index is very intuitive and operable while capturing 
changes happening in the political system as a whole, but at the cost of simplifying the 
concept too much, as changes in voting share might be just the result of alternance in the 
system. Bartolini and Mair (1990) present a modified version of TV, which allow to 
disaggregate TV in three in three figures: volatility due to entering or exiting parties 
(RegV), volatility due to changes in already established parties (AltV) and volatility due 
to changes in minor parties (OthV) 7.   
 
(2)   𝑇𝑉 = 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑉 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑉 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑉 
 
Note how, as Expression (2) states, AltV, RegV and OthV, are only the result of splitting 
TV in the three groups. By implementing this disaggregation of TV, the reason for the 
 
7 On Bartolini and Mair, a party is considered to be entering the party system when going from less than 
1% of the electoral share to having more than that. The opposite stands for exiting parties. Established 
parties are those which have more than 1% of electoral share in both elections. While parties with less than 




index’s value can be better traced. If a major share of TV is due to AltV, one might 
consider this normal under a democratic bipartisan system where alternance in power 
takes place. However, if it is RegV which represents a major share of TV, this would 
imply new parties entering into the system. As theoretical framework evidences, the event 
of new parties entering the political system and voters seeking for alternatives outside the 
political system, indicates the appearance of new cleavages, and instability till this 
cleavage is assumed by the system. In this direction, Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2017), 
propose the Political System Institutionalisation index (PSI). This index is based on what 
they identify as necessary conditions for institutionalisation of the political system: 
stability, predictability and the consistency of the previous two. PSI takes TV as a 
measure of stability, RegV as a measure of predictability and weights the same result for 
the previous three elections held, they compute the index as Expression (3) presents. 
 





















Where  𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 is the theoretical months to elapse between elections – which, in the case 
of Spain, would be 48 months. In an ideal scenario where the three elections are equally 
space in time by the theoretical months, the weight for the election in n=0 would be 3/6, 
the election in n=1 would be 2/6 and the last election at n=2 would be 1/6. While if all 
elections are held in a short space of time, all results would be similarly weight. 
 
PSI is an index ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 represents no electoral volatility in the last 
three elections, a scenario that, although unfeasible, would represent fully stable political 
system. The index is endowed of memory, meaning that the variable becomes not just a 
picture of the moment but portrays a trend in the period. This is understood to be 
important for the measure, as one might think that political stability is not something 
happening overnight but rather a process which develops with time. Also, by giving more 
importance to RegV – accounted both in TV and RegV -, PSI is giving more importance 
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to what Marks and Hooghe (2018) identified to be traditional parties being unable to re-
adapt their positions in front of new cleavages. So, adaptability of the political system, 
identified by Huntington (1968) as key characteristic for institutionalisation of the system 
and thus stability of the system, would be well captured in the proposed index. For these 
two reasons this index is understood to be suiting the intentions of the thesis of not just 
capturing eventual episodes of instability but rather periods of instability. 
 
The methodology of the PSI index is going to be applied to the electoral results for general 
elections 1996-20168 disaggregated by Spanish NUTS2 regions9. By doing so, each 
NUTS2 region will have a different PSI which will be used as the dependant variable in 
the model. When computing PSI by NUTS2 in Spain, results are similar to the ones found 
for Spain at Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2017), who computed PSI for several European 
countries in the period 1945-2015. In Figure 1, it can be seen how since 1995 till 2009, a 
positive trend is observed for the majority of regions, meaning an increment in the 
institutionalisation and increasing political stability in the period. This trend peaks at 
around 0.95 – similar figures as in Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2017) – for a majority of 
the regions. And then since 2009 the tendency is broken in a steeper or softer manner 
depending on the region. Exceptional are the observations for year 2016, as for almost all 
regions this year PSI grows. The reason for these unexpected results is the effect of the 
electoral repetition that took place in that year, where electoral volatility between the two 
immediate elections was low. Although, PSI index do incorporate the three last elections 
and weight them according to their temporal distance, the most recent election always has 
a major weight in the index. For that reason, observations of 2016 are found misleading 







8 As PSI require two passed elections electoral data used ranges from 1993-2016. The first observations of 
PSI is computed with just two elections instead of three, in order to be able to include one observation more 
into the sample. 
 
9 NUTS2 regions are the second level of Territorial Units for Statistics in Eurostat, these regions coincide 
in the case of Spain with Comunidades Autónomas. 
 24 
 




1. Source: Author’s calculations using General Elections data 1993-2016 by provinces extracted from 
Ministerio de Interior. www.infoelectoral.mir.es 
 
The results display also an accurate to reality scenario with diminishing stability after 
recession. It is also relevant, as seen in Figure 2, the negative correlation between extreme 
parties’ electoral share and PSI. Correlation between the variables is -0.59, which is 
something pointing at decreasing PSI as extreme ideologies support grow. However, 
given the short series used, only the entrance of one major extreme party is captured - 
Podemos in 2015. It would be interesting to enlarge the sample to consider the entrance 
of other extreme parties entering the system – VOX in 2019. Also, a weaker negative 
correlation is seen in Figure 3 between PSI and the voting share for parties with a 
territorial identity – either nationalist or regionalist. It would be interesting to analyse this 
relation in a deeper way and with more data available in future studies. As the national 
identity cleavage is becoming more relevant in the political system is not just a 
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2. Source: Author’s calculations using General Elections data 1993-2016 by provinces extracted from 
Ministerio de Interior. www.infoelectoral.mir.es 
 




3. Source: Author’s calculations using General Elections data 1993-2016 by provinces extracted from 


















































4.2 Measuring austerity 
Finding an operational measure of austerity for empirical purpose is also challenging. 
Austerity refers to a fiscal policy which pursues consolidation by undertaking budget cuts 
as the main instrument. Accordingly, it is clear that any variable measuring austerity, will 
have to come from public expenditure figures.  
 
Literature has used as measures for fiscal policy different strategies. Alesina et al. (2011) 
- who analyse political consequences of fiscal adjustments -propose taking into account 
only big (>1.5% of GDP) reductions of public deficit in order to distinguish conscious 
adjustments from cyclical effects. This strategy involves dropping several data points 
which in a short sample as the one studied in this thesis would imply a huge sacrifice. 
Also, taking this measure would mean to understand austerity as the result of both 
expenditure cuts and revenue increases through higher taxation levels. Generally, when 
referring to austerity, it is meant reductions on the expenditure side via reduction of 
services provided by the state. Centring the variable accounting for austerity on deficit 
figures, would mean deviating from the concept.  
 
Arias and Stasavage (2019) reach similar conclusions as Alesina et al. (2011), but they 
concentrate only on the expenditure side, portraying this way a better picture of what we 
could understand by austerity. They opt to use separately real public expenditure growth 
and public expenditure share on GDP, reaching similar results. However, using public 
expenditure as a share of GDP make the measure to depend not only on the fiscal policy 
implemented but also on the economic situation. For that reason, and although this 
measure is widely used in literature, this thesis is not going to use this as a measurement 
of austerity. The former variable – real public expenditure growth – seems appropriate 
for the objectives of the thesis – analyse at a regional level in Spain in the period 1996-
2016 the relation between the austerity measures and political instability. However, no 
data have been found disaggregated at NUTS2 level. For that reason, this measure is not 
going to be used in the analysis.  Also, as commented in Section 3, Arias and Stesavage 
(2019), estimates the model by using IV estimations in order to address mutual causality 
between dependent and independent variables. This issue, however, does not seem 
relevant for the period and the context in which this thesis is centred, as austerity have 




Notable, but unfeasible for this thesis, is the measure used by Fetzer (2019) and developed 
by Beatty and Fothergill (2013) to identify and quantify austerity. It is unfeasible not just 
because translating the same methodology to the Spanish context, becomes messy - as a 
big part of austerity was done by freezing civil servant wages or by only replacing exiting 
servants on a 10% rate, cuts whose effects are difficult to allocate. But also, because 
involving in a process of estimating the effects would require an amount of time and tools 
not available. 
 
From all data searched the one that is going to be used, because it finely disaggregates 
information by NUTS2 regions is Spanish Regional Accounts 2000-2017, more 
specifically the Households Rents Accounts. In these accounts two main variables 
regarding public expenditure are find: social benefits in cash, which are benefits under 
social protection schemes, and in-kind transfers, which are estimations done by Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística (INE) regarding the economic value of the services offered by 
public institutions. These two measures are appropriate for the purpose of analysing the 
effect of austerity on political instability, as they capture cuts of public expenditure and 
more specifically expenditure cuts on social protection and welfare system. In order to 
enlarge the sample data from the previous series - Spanish Regional Accounts 1995 - is 
incorporated. All data in the accounts is published in aggregate terms. This are deflated 
by the population in order to have per capita measures which do not depend on 
demographic effects. 
 
Finally, when observing in Figure 4 and Figure 5, the evolution of both, social benefits 
and in-kind transfers, many positive peaks which break the negative trend followed by a 
year where the trend re-establishes, are observed. This peaks usually coincide with an 
electoral year, what reinforces the idea of incumbent governments trying to gain support 
by executing expenditure booms. This is deeply discussed in voter rationality literature 
and specifically in Wolfers (2002). In order to distinguish the effect of the electoral year 
expenditure and the effect of cumulated fiscal policy, it is proposed to use not the 
observable change in the year of the election but the average change since last election, 
which would be seizing the whole fiscal policy implemented by the incumbent. It would 
be interesting in order to check for voter rationality, which figure is more relevant if the 
averaged change of the measures during the term, which would mean having voters who 
can rationally evaluate all the policy of incumbent, or the immediate change to the 
election, in which case voters would be acting in a more naïve manner.  
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Fig 4. Evolution of in-kind transfers by NUTS2 (1995-2015) 
 
4. Source: Author’s elaboration, using data regarding Change in In-kind transfers taken from Spanish Regional 
Accounts, INE. 
 
Fig 5. Evolution of Social Benefits in Spain by NUTS2 (1995-2015) 
 
 
5. Source: Author’s elaboration, using data regarding In-kind transfers taken from Spanish Regional Accounts 
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In this section it is going to be presented the empirical strategy to analyse the effect of 
social protection rents on political stability, which is captured using the PSI index 
proposed by Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2017).  The data that is going to be used 
involves a strongly balanced panel with the 19 NUTS2 Spanish regions and with a series 
spanning form 1996-2015. The data regarding PSI have been computed according to the 
original methodology expose in the previous section using general elections results10. 
Information regarding social protection rents, is taken from Spanish Regional Accounts 
Households’ rents. All regions have observations for the full period except for Ceuta and 
Melilla, which data prior 2000 was aggregately published.  
 
Expression (5) collects what would be the most basic model. Regressing PSI on the 
immediate observed changes in social benefits per capita and in-kind transfers per capita. 
When estimating this model, it is expected to find both 𝛽% and 𝛽& holding positive signs, 
as that would mean PSI and the regressors moving in the same direction. So, when more 
welfare state is implemented more institutionalised the political system is, and vice versa. 
Note that all models are estimated using robust standard errors estimations clustered by 
regions in order to avoid heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation problems affecting the 
standard error estimates and leading to potential Type I errors when doing significance 
tests for the coefficients.  
 
(5)   𝑃𝑆𝐼!,# =	𝛽' +	𝛽%	6Δ	𝐼𝑛	𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠	!,#; +	𝛽&	6Δ	𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑏𝑒𝑛	!,#; +	𝛼! +	𝜀!,#		  
 
The model is estimated using both random effects (5a) and fixed effects. The former 
estimator assumes covariance between 𝛼! and the other regressors, to be 0. If this 
assumption holds, random effects estimator is consistent and more efficient than 
estimating by fixed effects or pooled OLS, and thus it is a more desirable estimator to 
use. However, if the assumption does not hold, the estimator is inconsistent, which makes 
using the estimator a wrong choice. The Hausman test between the estimating the model 
via fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE), shows differences between the estimations 
 
10 General Elections included in the sample are: 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2015, except for Ceuta 
and Melilla, for which 1996 observation is not included as no economic data of the period is available. 
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not significant at a 10% level11. This result point at both, RE and FE, being a consistent 
estimator for the model. However, RE is preferable as it is a more efficient estimator. In 
Table 1 results for (5a) are displayed as well as the model estimated with fixed effects 
and robust standard errors (5b), for which the test for joint significance show significance, 
at a 1% level. The results between the two estimations are similar - as the Hausman 
statistic result advanced. In both cases, results show both regressors to be significant at a 
1% confidence level. The sign of 𝛽& is positive, meaning that both, PSI and Social 
Benefits changes, move in the same direction. When there is an increment of 1% in Social 
Benefits, it is expected to have a 0.55 increase in the PSI. Less intuitive seems the 
estimator for 𝛽%, which holds a negative and significative sign. The reason for such result 
may be due to expenditure booms on electoral years disturbing the interpretation of 𝛽%.   
 
Estimates (5c) and (5d), estimate the model as (5a) and (5b) respectively, but including 
similar control variables to the ones used by Arias and Stesavage (2019). These control 
variables are included in order to control for economic situation and involve changes in 
GDP per capita of the region and the 	𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(𝐿𝑛). The former is expected to 
hold a positive sign, meaning that when economy grow, the system is more stable. The 
latter - 𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(𝐿𝑛) – is expected to be insignificant or to hold a small value, 
as variance of the variable occur more between regions than within, and it’s effect will be 
majorly captured with per regions fixed or random effects. It is also added a control for 
economic cycle during the government’s term. Expression (6), shows the way this 
measure is computes, being T the years elapsed between elections. This variable, as in 
the case of changes in GDP per capita, is expected to hold a significant positive value 
indicating PSI moving in the same direction as the variable. All data concerning GDP per 
capita is taken from the Spanish Regional Accounts published by INE. 
 
(6) 		Δ	𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝚤𝑡𝑎(,#G = 	 %)∑ Δ	𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎!,#$*
)
*+'    
 
When including the control variables for the economic situation, the significance of the 
social protection measures – changes in social benefits per capita and changes in in-kind 
transfers per capita – drop in both cases, but more drastically in the case of 𝛽&. Both 
 
11 Hausman Test results can be found in Annex 2. 
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estimates maintain the sign as in (5a) and (5b), but their values are much closer to 0 and, 
in the case of changes in social benefits, the result becomes non-significant. The estimates 
for the control variables, point out expected results except for Δ	𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎, which 
has a negative and significant associated coefficient. However, when averaging the 
changes occurred during the term, the value is positive. This might lead one to think, that 
voters are behaving rationally, and, when they are called to the polls, they make a 
retrospective analysis for the full term and not just for the last year change. Results from 
the Hausman test, reject RE being a consistent estimator at a 5% level. Still, interpretation 
of (5c) and (5d), being the former inconsistent and the latter consistent, do not drastically 
change. Except for  𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(𝐿𝑛), whose coefficient is, as expected, not 
significant.  
 
Table 1. Regressions estimates: PSI Index and Immediate change on Social 
protection rents. 
	
1. Source: Author’s elaboration, using calculated PSI index by NUTS2 Spanish Region as dependent variable.  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 




Variable (5a) (5b) (5c) (5d) 
Δ	𝐼𝑛	𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 -0.399 *** -0.425 *** -0.176 ** -0.176 ** 
(0.058)  (0.064)  (0.078)  (0.083) 
 
Δ	𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑏𝑒𝑛 0.547 *** 0.565 *** 0.072  0.144  
(0.055)  (0.057)  (0.107)  (0.119)  
Δ	𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 
 
   -0.987 *** -0.930 ***  




   0.920 *** 0.784 ***  
   (0.224)  (0.252) 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(𝐿𝑛)     -0.040 *** -0.023  
    (0.009)  (0.020)  
Random effects ✓  ✓  
Region fixed effects  ✓  ✓ 
Robust standard errors ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Consistent estimator  ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
Observations 93 93 93 93 
Overall R2 0.340 0.339 0.542 0.517 
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One reason that might be given to the unexpected results found in Table 1, is that what 
could have an impact on stability are not the changes prior to the elections but the trends 
of the measures during the period. With the purpose of testing this hypothesis, it is 
proposed a second model, collected in expression (7). This model is similar to the prior 
but changes the main regressors for averaged values of the measures during the term – 
using the same process as described in expression (6) for GDP per capita. The expected 
estimates are as in the prior model expectations, to find positive relation between the 
social protection measures and PSI. 
 
(7)  𝑃𝑆𝐼!,# =	𝛽' +	𝛽%	6Δ	𝐼𝑛	𝑘𝚤𝑛𝑑	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠(,#G ; +	𝛽&	6Δ	𝑆𝑜𝑐𝚤𝑎𝑙	𝑏𝑒𝑛	(,#G ; +	𝛼! +	𝜀!,#		 
 
Results of the estimation are displayed in Table 2 and show very similar results between 
estimating with RE (7a) or with FE (7b), making both consistent estimators. This is 
strongly supported by the results of the Hausman test.  In terms of efficiency they don’t 
present major differences either. The values found, provide more logical interpretations. 
In the case of 𝛽%, the value is significant at a 1% level and is strongly positive. Meaning 
that for every 1% extra average change in social benefits, PSI increases by almost the 
same token. Results for 𝛽&, are, by far, non-significant. It is interesting to see how, by 
comparing the R2 statistics of (7a) and (7b) with the ones obtained in (5a) and (5b), this 
model seems to be better explaining the changes in PSI index and averaged changes to be 
better measures for austerity than immediate changes. As the former conceives voters as 
more rationally behaving and doing a retrospection that does not limit to the last observed 
change.  
 
When adding the same control variables as in the previous model, results keep displaying 
similar information regarding the relation of the main regressors and PSI index. The 
Hausman test statistic still significantly states RE estimation and FE estimation to be 
consistent, which make RE estimations to supply more desirable estimations when 
interpreting the results. Results for 𝛽&are still significant and relevant in both (7c) and 
(7d) although, by including the control variables, the estimations have been deflated. The 
results for this coefficient are the expected and support the main hypothesis of the thesis, 
that fiscal policy which reduces social protection, imply destabilisation of the system. On 
the other hand, the results for 𝛽%, are not significant even at a 10% level, which point at 
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in-kind transfers changes not affecting PSI index. This different relation, between the two 
main regressors and the dependent variable, might lead to similar conclusions as in Fetzer 
(2019), where more critical reforms on social protection which affect lower-income 
households, are identified to entail a major political cost than those affecting relatively 
better-off parts of society. One might understand social benefit programs to aim more 
critical cases, while in-kind transfers usually involve general services offered to all 
population regardless the income. The results, although acknowledging the limitations of 
the study, might be pointing at social protection cuts effects on political stability not 
depending that much on the amount of people affected but on how critical is the effect.  
 
Table 2. Regression estimates: PSI Index and Term averaged change on 
Social Protection rents. 
 
	
2. Source: Author’s elaboration, using calculated PSI index by NUTS2 Spanish Region as dependent variable.  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
* p	0.10,** p	0.05,*** p	0.01	 
  
Variable (7a) (7b) (7c) (7d) 
Δ	𝐼𝑛	𝑘𝚤𝑛𝑑	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠G  
0.068  0.070  -0.241  -0.047 
 
(0.120)  (0.118)  (0.165)  (0.178) 
 
Δ	𝑆𝑜𝑐𝚤𝑎𝑙	𝑏𝑒𝑛G  
0.918 *** 0.919 *** 0.633 *** 0.526 *** 
(0.103)  (0.107)  (0.131)  (0.159)  
Δ	𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 
 
   -0.755 *** -0.692 ***  




   0.693 *** 0.541 **  
   (0.155)  (0.229) 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(𝐿𝑛) 
    -0.043 *** -0.019  
    (0.008)  (0.024)  
Random Effects ✓  ✓  
Region fixed effects  ✓  ✓ 
Robust standard errors ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Consistent estimator ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 93 93 93 93 





This thesis aimed to study the effect of austerity on political stability in the context of 
Spain 1996-2015. These two concepts – austerity and political instability – have been 
quantified using changes in social protection rents, for the first one, and the PSI index for 
the latter. The measures display both events taking place in the studied period, coinciding 
both in time after 2009. The main hypothesis was that the weakening of the welfare state 
and social protection programs, as a result of austerity, have been important factors 
explaining the increasing political instability in the period. In this line, it was expected to 
get significant and positive results for the coefficients of the variables. However, results 
seem to partially support the hypothesis established. Interesting are the findings pointing 
at averaged changes for the full term being more useful that immediate changes. These 
results support the idea of voters having a behaviour better profiled as rational.  Finally, 
result for economic situation  
 
Nevertheless, one must be very cautious when reading the presented results, as sample 
used is not ideal.  The amount of observation is greatly limited by the availability of 
economic data used to measure austerity. The fact that political results are usually only 
observed every four years, aggravates this problem, making that in a series of 20 years 
only 6 observations per region is available. The analysis would greatly benefit from 
enlarging the sample and to do so it might be needed to change the measures defining 
austerity for others which have larger series available. It would be extremely interesting 
to keep this methodology, adding the period 2016-2020. As in the employed dataset, a 
major populist shock as VOX being third force in parliament, is not captured. This new 
wave of extreme-right populism in the South -with VOX in Spain or Cinque Stelle in Italy 
– does not fit with the model of populism succeeding in the region (Algan et al., 2017; 
Rodrik, 2017b).  
 
A more practical option would be to enlarge the regions included in the sample. But, the 
development of a dataset with foreign countries, would require an amount of time to 
collect electoral data from the different country databanks and a knowledge regarding 
foreign political party systems, which make it unfeasible for a thesis like this. Finally, a 
final option to enlarge the sample would be considering regions at a NUT3 level, for 
which electoral information is still disaggregated. However, economic data at NUTS3 
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data is vastly limited and usually dispersed among the different regional statistical 
institutes. It has to be noted that new experimental statistics have been published since 
2015 by INE, disaggregating income related data at a sub-municipal level. This data, if 
available with larger series, could result very useful for a study like this, where averages 
of big regions spoil many relevant dynamics. 
 
Also, it would be interesting to do the same exercise but computing the PSI index with 
autonomic and European electoral data. This would allow to better test for voter 
rationality, as it would be capturing how do voters understands the scope of action of each 
political institution. In the case of using European elections data, information would also 
portray how institutionalised are EU institutions in each region. Allowing for a further 
study testing if, as with economic divergence among regions, there exists a lack of 
institutionalisation convergence in the EU.  
 
Finally, one variable which has not been included in the discussion, but which could 
indeed be a relevant one, is economic inequality. The results suggest that austerity 
implemented on social benefits programs is more destabilising than cuts on in-kind 
transfers. The reason behind these results, might be on the redistributive power of each 
of the programs. While both are redistributive in its nature, it might be the case that social 
benefits aid those who could feel more alienated from society and the system. Alesina 
and Perotti (1996), already found significant relation between larger inequality and 
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8.1 ANNEX 1: Summary statistics of the relevant variables 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
𝑃𝑆𝐼 
overall .9208711 .0367138 .7972532 .9744398 N =     131 
between  .0187122 .8854155 .9444779 n =      19 
within  .0318354 .813583 .9803265 T = 6.89474 
Δ	𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑏𝑒𝑛 
overall .0424444 .0368668 -.0293527 .1609425 N =     408 
between  .0043828 .0316062 .0494648 n =      19 
within  .0366368 -.0273889 .1579976 T-bar = 21.4737 
Δ	𝑆𝑜𝑐𝚤𝑎𝑙	𝑏𝑒𝑛/  
overall .0409564 .0274848 -.0087636 .0799725 N =     112 
between  .0041336 .0309485 .0482335 n =      19 
within  .0272008 -.0060742 .0822524 T = 5.89474 
Δ	𝐼𝑛	𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 
overall .0441711 .0473201 -.1430229 .1664875 N =     408 
between  .0041802 .0362618 .0507525 n =      19 
within  .0471492 -.1438118 .1618069 T-bar = 21.4737 
Δ	𝐼𝑛	𝑘𝚤𝑛𝑑	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠/  
overall .0426452 .0318871 -.0234543 .0968338 N =     112 
between  .0039372 .0348483 .0491525 n =      19 
within  .0316505 -.025376 .0974519 T = 5.89474 
Δ	𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 
overall .0276376 .0330645 -.0628252 .0853548 N =     408 
between  .005801 .0148358 .0380351 n =      19 
within  .0326097 -.0617309 .0878084 T-bar = 21.4737 
Δ	𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝚤𝑡𝑎/  
overall .0267894 .0283901 -.0309716 .0712347 N =     112 
between  .0054565 .0155957 .0367434 n =      19 
within  .0279048 -.0310719 .0672628 T = 5.89474 
𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(Ln) 
overall 986.139 .2516584 9.075.665 1.037.427 N =     355 
between  .1904354 9.500.023 1.019.671 n =      19 





8.2 ANNEX 2: Hausman Tests results 




Results don’t reject the H0 with 10% significance level. Thus, Random Effects estimation is 
preferable, as it is both consistent and efficient. 
 
Hausman Test between Expression (5) including economic situation control variables, estimated 





Results reject the H0 with 5% significance level. Thus, Random Effects estimation are 
inconsistent. Fixed effects are preferable, as they are consistent. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1147
                          =        4.33
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   c_inkindt     -.4250358    -.3988154       -.0262204        .0112554
    c_socben      .5653097     .5472925        .0180171        .0084343
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0124
                          =       14.57
                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
  log_gdpcap     -.0225031    -.0404409        .0179379        .0119594
   ac_gdpcap        .78418     .9203796       -.1361997        .0454645
    c_gdpcap     -.9295948    -.9871425        .0575476        .0289609
   c_inkindt     -.1757963    -.1761723         .000376        .0119928
    c_socben      .1438669     .0723399         .071527        .0270657
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))









Results don’t reject the H0 with huge (90%) significance level. Thus, Random Effects estimation 
is preferable, as it is both consistent and efficient. 
 
Hausman Test between Expression (7) including economic situation control variables, estimated 
through fixed effects (fe) and through random effects (re): 
 
 
Results don’t reject the H0 with 10% significance level. Thus, Random Effects estimation is 
preferable, as it is both consistent and efficient. 
  
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9829
                          =        0.03
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
  ac_inkindt       .069701     .0681508        .0015502        .0186736
   ac_socben      .9191322     .9183795        .0007527        .0269493
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1224
                          =        8.68
                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
  log_gdpcap      -.018725    -.0429986        .0242736        .0157311
   ac_gdpcap      .5410316     .6925428       -.1515112         .111402
    c_gdpcap     -.6922662    -.7547418        .0624756        .0910525
  ac_inkindt     -.0472511    -.2405832        .1933321        .1106553
   ac_socben      .5260762     .6332565       -.1071803        .0495545
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
  
 
